What are 'call centers', how much do they earn, and who protects them?

The NABU and SAP conducted searches at the office of the Prosecutor General on September 5, reporting that they uncovered a criminal organization that was taking bribes from fraudulent call centers. In the photo that circulated in all media, a safe filled with bundles of dollars illustrates NABU's message that prosecutors were "legalizing millions."

So what are these fraudulent call centers? How much and how do they make money? Dilo has gathered data from reliable sources of international investigations.

In April 2026, the international non-governmental organization investigating transnational organized crime, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), published its research with the eloquent title "Kyiv Calling: The scam call center phenomenon in Ukraine."

Key estimates from the Kyiv Calling report: about 1,000 fraudulent call centers in Ukraine. Approximately 60,000 employees - about two-thirds of the workforce of the legal banking sector. An average office can earn $1 million in revenue per month, while a large one can earn up to $3 million. The estimated total revenue of the entire industry is up to $1 billion monthly. Large call centers can employ 250-300 workers at the same time. At least 29 countries have reported victims.

Here's another example. A network of fraudulent call centers in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Ivano-Frankivsk employed around 100 people. They defrauded victims of over 10 million euros in various ways. The number of victims is about 400. This was reported back in December by the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust).

In a UN report from June 2026, citing a UNODC study from 2025, it mentions approximately 1,500 criminal call centers in Ukraine. Among the victims of the described fraud are predominantly Ukrainians, particularly internally displaced persons; criminals also target people in Western Europe and beyond.

There are several popular schemes. Pretending to be a bank or police employee. Convincing people to update banking applications, scaring them with the alleged blocking of accounts. "This way, the perpetrators gained remote access to the victims' smartphones and internet banking. After that, money was transferred to controlled accounts and crypto wallets," law enforcement reported about one of the call centers in Odesa.

Other options include:

• Pseudo-brokers and fake investment platforms Victims are offered "guaranteed passive income" from trading crypto, stocks, or oil. Fake personal accounts are created where people see virtual profits, but when they try to withdraw money, they are asked for additional "commissions" and "taxes."
• Call from law enforcement (a relative in trouble). Emotional pressure demanding urgent transfer of money to resolve legal issues. For example - your son hit someone, a bribe is needed for the police.
• Recovery of lost funds: Re-fraud of people who have already been victimized by scammers. They receive calls from "international lawyers" or "regulators" promising to return money for a fee.

There are several reasons for this. Destroying one "office" usually just means that within a few days, the equipment and team will move to a new location or switch to remote work. Moreover, most large Ukrainian fraudulent call centers deliberately do not operate against Ukrainian citizens to minimize local resonance. The main targets are usually residents of the EU, Kazakhstan, Poland, the UK, or the USA. A separate topic is the use of cryptocurrencies. Money flows are instantly withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the classical banking system. This makes it difficult to gather evidence that the money was indeed earned through criminal means.

In a research compilation released in April 2026, GI-TOC explains the resilience of fraudulent networks as a combination of technology, financial infrastructure, organized crime, and corruption. The organization notes that systemic results require investigations into networks and money flows, eliminating cover-ups, and international cooperation.

It's very simple - for a regular fee, corrupt law enforcement allows the office to operate, can warn about searches, or conduct these searches and allow operations to continue. The same Kyiv Calling report cites bribe amounts - $10,000 to $15,000 per month, although there is no single tariff. In fact, owners buy the opportunity to continue their fraud even after coming under the scrutiny of law enforcement.

The investigation by NABU and SAP unfolds against the backdrop of international attention to Ukrainian fraudulent call centers. Europol and Eurojust have been assisting in investigating the activities of such networks for years. In 2025-2026, Ukrainian fraudulent call centers became the subject of several thorough international studies. UNODC examined them in a report on organized crime during the war, while GI-TOC dedicated a separate study to the Ukrainian industry called Kyiv Calling. At the same time, Eurojust reported on joint operations of Ukrainian and European law enforcement in Kyiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Kharkiv.

This content is provided for general informational purposes only and doesn't constitute financial, investment, legal, or tax advice. Any events, rewards, online promotions, or related information mentioned herein should not be considered a recommendation, solicitation, or invitation to purchase, sell, trade, or otherwise deal in any crypto assets. Crypto assets are highly volatile and may result in loss. The availability of WEEX services, products, and related events may vary by region. You are responsible for ensuring that your participation is in accordance with applicable local laws and regulations.